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ABSTRACT: This article recounts some of the basic history of laser
weapons in the context of the great-power rivalries of the United
States, Russia, and China. The author then offers his perspective on
the current escalation of investments in high-tech warfare.

D

efense professionals increasingly believe high-energy lasers
(HELs), which achieve continuous power output of at least 20
kilowatts (kW), are technologically mature enough to become
the mainstay weapon of advanced militaries.1 An examination of past
efforts to develop such weapons, however, suggests caution. The history
of actualizing lasers as a weapon can be summarized as one of repeated
attempts to develop ambitious, big-ticket laser weapon systems before the
associated technologies were sufficiently mature. This article argues the
impetus for these premature—and ultimately disappointing—efforts was
overexuberance within America’s national security establishment about
the potential military applications of lasers. This imbalance between
promise and readiness resulted in the United States losing time and
significant sums of money. To support this claim, the article examines
the role of technological hype in the American experience of developing
powerful laser weapons.
Current optimism about laser weapons is far from novel. At the
end of the last millennium, the Chinese “Academy of Military Science,
the People Liberation Army’s leading think tank on future warfare,
believe[d] lasers would likely become an integral aspect of twenty-first
century combat.” 2 At about the same time, the US Defense Science
Board noted in a comprehensive review that such weapons had “the
potential to change future military operations in dramatic ways.” 3 For
more than half a century, several countries—and as with most cuttingedge, defense-related technologies, the United States is the exemplar
case—channeled significant sums into developing antimateriel laser
weapons. But overall, these attempts yielded disappointing results.
1      Jason. D. Ellis, Directed-Energy Weapons: Promise and Prospects (Washington, DC: Center for a New
American Security, 2015); J. R. Wilson, “At Long Last, Laser Weapons Are Nearing Deployment,”
Military & Aerospace Electronics 28, no. 7 (July 25, 2017); and Andy Extance, “Laser Weapons Get
Real,” Nature 521 (May 2015): 408–10.
2      Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States (Carlisle, Pa.:
Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), 204.
3      Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L),
Defense Science Board Task Force on High Energy Laser Weapon Systems Applications (Washington, DC:
Department of Defense [DoD], 2001), iv.
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Despite past failures, interest in HEL weapons has not waned. Many
states today are looking to lasers to solve a range of near-term tactical
and longer-term strategic challenges. As a response to the penetration
of its airspace by North Korean drones, for example, South Korea plans
to deploy HEL weapons at its border by 2020.4 Staying with addressing
threats on the Korean Peninsula, US defense planners are exploring a
more ambitious scheme to fit high altitude, long endurance manned or
unmanned aircraft with powerful lasers to intercept North Korean (and
other) ballistic missiles during their boost phase.5
At one level, it is no surprise states would persist in pursuing HEL
weapons. Humans have always sought advantages over each other
through acquiring novel or superior technology. In the high stakes of
war, maintaining a technological edge over adversaries is a life or death
business. Though technologies usually advance incrementally, sometimes a sudden leap forward can lead to high levels of exuberance about
a technology’s potential to alter established ways of doing things.6 For
these reasons, break-through technologies command the imagination of
military leaders. This perspective is especially true for states that pursue
qualitative rather than quantitative advantages during arms races.7 As
Henry A. Kissinger wrote shortly before lasers were first successfully
tested, “Every country lives with the nightmare that even if it puts
forth its best efforts its survival may be jeopardized by a technological
breakthrough on the part of its opponent.” 8
The laser possesses desirable properties emanating from the base
concept of the technology—the production of very intense, highly
focusable light—that make it highly attractive as a potential weapon,
giving early adopters significant advantages.9 The concept of focusing
intense light against an enemy has long piqued the imagination of
warfighters. One legendary account of the Siege of Syracuse in 212 BC
tells of Greek forces setting fire to Roman sails by using mirrors to
create a “flaming death ray” of sunlight.10

  4     KH Digital 2, “S. Korea To Develop Laser Weapons To Counter NK Drones by 2020,” Korea
Herald, January 6, 2017.
  5      Cristina Maza, “U.S. Has a New Plan To Fight North Korea: Shoot Down Kim Jong Un’s
Missiles as They Launch, But Can It Work?,” Newsweek, April 12, 2018.
6      Harro van Lente, Charlotte Spitters, and Alexander Peine, “Comparing Technological Hype
Cycles: Towards a Theory,” Technological Forecasting and Social Change 80, no. 8 (October 2013): 1615–28.
   7      Taik-young Hamm, Arming the Two Koreas: State, Capital, and Military Power (London: Routledge,
2012); Samuel P. Huntington, “Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results,” Public Policy 8 (1958): 41–86;
Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control, with the assistance of
Donald G. Brennan (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), 497–538; Hedley Bull, The Control
of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age (New York: Praeger, 1961); and Grant
Tedrick Hammond, Plowshares into Swords: Arms Races in International Politics, 1840–1991 (Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press, 1993).
8      Henry A. Kissinger, “Arms Control, Inspection and Surprise Attack,” Foreign Affairs 38, no.
3 (July 1960): 557–75.
  9      W. Brian Arthur, “The Structure of Invention,” Research Policy 36, no. 2 (March 2007): 274–87.
10      Jeremy Hsu, “Archimedes’ Flaming Death Ray Was Probably Just a Cannon, Study
Finds,” Christian Science Monitor, June 29, 2010, https://www.csmonitor.com/Science/2010/0629/
Archimedes-flaming-death-ray-was-probably-just-a-cannon-study-finds.

Technological Innovation: Problems & Prospects

Rossiter

35

Regardless of the level of conceptual attractiveness, decisions
to develop any novel technology are taken under conditions of great
uncertainty. For one thing, unforeseen technical hurdles encountered
during development can stymie efforts to produce an operationally
viable system. Even when the technology reaches operational maturity,
end users may struggle to incorporate the new system within their
existing concept of operations or fail to see the value of adopting it in
the first place.11 When it comes to selecting a potential new technology
to mature into a battle-winning weapon, there rarely is ever such a thing
as a sure bet.
Every decision to invest in one technology comes with opportunity
costs. Most countries face something approximating this dilemma,
but it is especially acute for the United States. Current and upcoming
decisions on the allocation of defense resources will have a major bearing
on whether America can hold its traditional military technological
superiority or will see this advantage erode over time. Indeed, there is
growing concern among many senior defense officials that the United
States is falling behind competitors, particularly China, who have
embarked on ambitious plans to develop emerging technologies with
military uses.12
At present, the vast majority of US defense investments go into
long-cycle programs to build successors to legacy systems. Critics
believe this approach undermines the American goal of maintaining
military technological advantage. Instead, they propose the US military
should focus more on harnessing new and emerging innovations, such
as artificial intelligence and robotics, in order to retain the country’s
technological edge over its adversaries.13
Decisions about which technologies to develop into future weapon
systems may be complicated by the influence of hype, which has long
been recognized in business literature.14 Hype can result in certain
technologies attracting attention and resources disproportionate to their
realistically known attributes. At worst, it can result in betting on the
wrong horse. The analyses derived from this case study have implications
for US strategists and defense planners charged with the difficult task of
trying to achieve offset advantage by successfully leveraging America’s
technological prowess at a time of downward pressure on defense
spending and an upward pressure of spiraling costs.

11      Ash Rossiter, “Drone Usage by Militant Groups: Exploring Variation in Adoption,” Defense
& Security Analysis 34, no. 2 (2018).
12      Cade Metz, “Artificial Intelligence Is Now a Pentagon Priority. Will Silicon Valley Help?,”
New York Times, August 26, 2018.
13      John McCain, “Remarks by Senator John McCain at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce”
(speech, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Procurement Council Policy Meeting, Washington, DC, July
29, 2015).
14      Mads Borup et al., “The Sociology of Expectations in Science and Technology,” Technology
Analysis and Strategic Management 18, no. 3–4 (July–September 2006): 285–298; and Harro van Lente,
Promising Technology: The Dynamics of Expectations in Technological Developments (Eburon: Delft, 1993).
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Initial Hype

As mentioned above, the level of interest a new piece of technology
garners is influenced by its envisioned applications. Thus, when the laser
was first demonstrated, it was said to be a solution in search of a problem.
Before long, however, analysts started to see lasers as defensive weapons
and possibly even as “the biggest breakthrough in the weapons area
since the atomic bomb.” 15 According to one defense analyst, US military
interest during 1962 was such that “there [was] scarcely an Air Force,
Army, and to a lesser degree, Navy, agency” disinterested in exploring
“some type of basic or applied research or experimental development
with optical masers,” which were the forerunner of lasers.16
Pilot ideas ranged from using lasers as communication conduits to
Chairman Mao Zedong instructing his chief scientist to “organize a
group of people to specifically study [the death ray]. Have a small group
of people specializing in it who do not eat dinner or do other things.” 17
Working from the presupposition that “war has always had offensive
and defensive aspects,” Mao ordered his scientists to think about how
lasers might have defensive uses as well as offensive ones.18 Consequently,
he approved the development of high-powered lasers “to counter high
altitude bombers and reconnaissance platforms” under an advanced
program known as Project 640-3.19 Most early HEL military research
programs funded in the United States were similarly for antiaircraft,
antimissile, and anti-tank systems.20
For those would-be early adopters who tried, producing a viable
HEL weapon proved harder than expected.21 Huge technical obstacles
related to laser power, beam quality and propagation abounded. Early
laser programs at the lower end of the energy spectrum did, however,
lead to many successful military applications in the United States and
the Soviet Union, and later among some European nations. The most
important operational contribution was in laser radars used for remote
sensing, target designation, and range finding.22 By the end of the decade,
the United States had developed bombs with guidance systems that could
home in on light reflected from a pulsed laser beam, ushering in the age
15      Letter from Major General A. Schomburg to Lieutenant General J. H. Hinrichs, January
16, 1962, history office, US Army Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, AL, quoted in
Robert W. Seidel, “From Glow to Flow: A History of Military Laser Research and Development,”
Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 18, no. 1 (1987): 114.
16      Barry Miller, “Services To Push Optical Maser Effort,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 76
(January 15, 1962): 92–104.
17      “中国激光武器的起步：邓小平指出将是主力装备 [China’s laser weapons commence:
Deng pointed out they will be decisive equipment],” Ifeng, September 9, 2010, quoted in Richard
D. Fisher Jr., China’s Progress with Directed Energy Weapons (testimony, Hearing on China’s Advanced
Weapons, Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, DC,
February 23, 2017).
18      “China’s laser weapons,” Ifeng.
19      Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization, 195–96.
20      Seidel, “From Glow to Flow.”
21      Melissa Olson, “History of Laser Weapon Research,” Leading Edge 7, no. 4 (2012): 28.
22      Vasyl Molenby et al., “Laser Radar: Historical Perspective—From the East to the West,”
Optical Engineering 56, no. 3 (2016).
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of precision-guided munitions, a key component of the Second Offset.23
In the mid- to late 1970s, America significantly scaled up the power
output of chemical lasers.24 This development led some members of the
American and Soviet defense communities to consider lasers an ideal
candidate for ballistic missile defense.25 The prospect of high-energy
lasers altering the strategic balance made the technology highly alluring;
their readiness became a second order consideration.

Strategic Seduction

Because of its minimal diffraction, called collimation, a coherently
emitted laser beam can reach long ranges while maintaining a small,
precise spot of concentrated energy on a chosen target. This attribute
makes lasers conceptually ideal for ballistic missile defense and for
anti-satellite weapons. Indeed, as far back as the early 1960s, the United
States funded research on the effects of high-energy laser pulses on
missile warheads.26 Renewed American interest in lasers for ballistic
missile defense in the early 1980s coincided with theoretical studies on
satellites using small nuclear explosions to “pump” x-ray laser weapons
to defeat such intercontinental weapons. Despite broad skepticism about
megawatt-class nuclear-powered lasers on satellites being feasible in
this role, the concept formed a central plank of the Strategic Defense
Initiative outlined in Reagan’s so-called Star Wars speech.27
Although Moscow did not respond by attempting to develop an
analogous system of space-based nuclear-powered lasers, Soviet leaders
did embark upon a lower cost, asymmetric response, namely, a groundbased laser program for knocking out satellites.28 Following the 1972
treaty banning antiballistic missile systems, the focus shifted toward
producing anti-satellite weapons.29 Complementary to these gamechanging efforts to control space, the Soviet Union designed a module
for combat that included capabilities for carrying, among other items, a
laser weapon capable of disabling enemy satellite electronics. After the
test model failed to reach orbit in 1987, Moscow tried to fit the prototype

23      Peter DeLeon, The Laser-Guided Bomb: Case History of a Development (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 1974).
24      Elihu Zimet and Christopher Mann, Directed Energy Weapons—Are We There Yet? (Washington,
DC: National Defense University, 2009), 2.
25      Ellis, Directed-Energy Weapons, 24; and Bob Preston et al., Space Weapons, Earth Wars (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, 2002).
26      Seidel, “From Glow to Flow,” 121.
27      Frances FitzGerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 370–411; and Leslie H. Gelb, “Vision of Space Defense
Posing New Challenges,” New York Times, March 3, 1985.
28      Stephen M. Meyer, “Soviet Strategic Programmes and the US SDI,” Survival 27, no.
6 (November 1985): 274–92; David Holloway, “The Strategic Defense Initiative and the Soviet
Union,” Daedalus 114, no. 3 (Summer 1985): 257–78; and Don Oberdorfer, “Military Response
Planned to ‘Star Wars,’ Soviet Says,” Washington Post, March 8, 1985.
29      Sebastien Roblin, “Russia’s Cold War Super Weapon (Put Lasers on Everything It Can),”
National Interest, July 16, 2017.

38

Parameters 48(4) Winter 2018–19

anti-satellite laser onto a modified military transport aircraft, which was
equally unsuccessful.30
American interest in lasers was also driven not by technological
developments but perception of Soviet progress in this area. Throughout
the latter half of the 1980s, the Pentagon repeatedly warned of a “laser
gap” opening up if the Soviets converted their anti-satellite lasers into
a ballistic missile defense system.31 Despite considerable scientific
research, though, the Soviet Union failed to take HELs past a nascent
prototype.32 The myth of the Soviet “killer” laser nonetheless kept US
military research money channeled toward lasers.33 American research
and development (R&D) spending on HELs peaked in 1989, but fell off
rapidly after Moscow’s slow progress became evident.
Undeterred by technical hurdles and tremendous development
costs, the United States pursued lasers for ballistic missile defense
through the mid-1990s. The Air Force initiated the Airborne Laser
project, which entailed aircraft carrying lasers above the dense layer
of atmosphere at 12,000 meters. Beams emitted from the chemically
powered onboard devices were expected to cause an enemy’s ballistic
missile fuel storage tank to explode at ranges of hundreds of kilometers.
But after three-and-a-half decades of underperformance, HELs still
generated tremendous hype.
Commenting on the project in 1997, Secretary of the Air Force Sheila
E. Widnall declared, “It isn’t very often an innovation comes along that
revolutionizes our operational concepts, tactics, and strategies. You can
probably name them on one hand—the atomic bomb, the satellite, the
jet engine, stealth, and the microchip. It’s possible the airborne laser
is in this league.” 34 Despite high expectations—and a successful test
against a missile in flight—size, weight, and power issues plagued the
project. With $5 billion spent before the program was canceled in 2012,
the chemical laser could only be carried by a Boeing 747, and the weak
beam required the aircraft to orbit extremely close to an adversary’s
launch sites.35
The prospect of potentially upending strategic calculations, rather
than the estimated merits of the technology, best accounts for much
of the sustained hype in HEL weapons. As some point out, ballistic
missile defense is “an issue heavily encrusted with multiple policy
and ideological considerations lying outside the general parameters of
30      Alexander Korolkov, “Laser Warfare: Sci-fi Fantasy or Future Reality,” Russia Beyond,
November 18, 2014.
31      Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union
Develop New Military Technologies (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 258–61.
32      Bengt Anderberg and Myron L. Wolbarsht, Laser Weapons: The Dawn of a New Military Age
(New York: Plenum Press, 1992), 133.
33      Frank von Hippel and Thomas B. Cochran, “The Myth of the Soviet ‘Killer’ Laser,” New
York Times, August 19, 1989.
34      Angelo M. Codevilla, “This Missile Defense Program Just Won’t Fly,” Wall Street Journal,
October 22, 1997.
35      “Airborne Laser System (ABL) YAL 1A,” Air Force Technology, accessed April 9, 2019; and
Katie Drummond, “RIP, Raygun: Pentagon’s Laser Plane Laid to Rest,” Wired, February 21, 2012.
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whether or not the critical intercept technologies actually work.” 36 Large
defense contractors also likely have incentives to tout the possibilities for
lasers given the potential reward of government funding for high risk,
high reward research.

Promise-Readiness Equilibrium

In the early twenty-first century, America’s emphasis shifted from
pursuing ambitious airborne and space-based kilowatt-class laser
projects to developing less powerful devices intended to intercept
smaller objects over shorter distances.37 Cold War priorities—especially
the “hard kill” of ballistic missiles—required incredibly powerful lasers
that could apply beams accurately on a target for several seconds over
great distances. Laser systems for defeating small objects over shorter
ranges have lower technical requirements.
While laser weapons can potentially kill targets in the open faster
and at much greater ranges, they cannot fire in a ballistic arc over a hill
or over the horizon like conventional artillery without a sophisticated
relay of mirrors.38 Other properties of HEL systems do, however, give
them comparative advantages over conventional weapons for point
defense against rockets, artillery, mortars, and other small objects.
Laser weapon systems can fire quickly and engage multiple targets
simultaneously, and depending on the power source, they potentially
have a limitless magazine.
Unlike most conventional kinetic weapons, lasers can produce
tailored effects to cause a specified level of damage to a target and to
minimize collateral damage. The cost per shot is potentially negligible,
which makes laser weapon systems a cost-effective, long-term option
for intercepting numerous, inexpensive targets. This favorable costexchange equation is an important budgetary attribute in a world where
weaker opponents can use plentiful, cheap weapons to overwhelm more
technological advanced nations.39
American laser projects for countering rockets, artillery, and mortars
in the 2000s initially built upon prototypes of the much more powerful
devices developed and tested in the 1980s and 1990s, such as the joint
US-Israeli tactical high-energy laser demonstrator.40 Though this system
successfully destroyed rocket, artillery, and mortar rounds in flight
during field tests between 2000 and 2005, major challenges associated
with portability, the logistics of handling hazardous chemicals, and
36      Roger Handberg, Ballistic Missile Defense and the Future of American Security: Agendas, Perceptions,
Technology, and Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 3.
37      Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Laser Weapons: Lower Expectations, Higher Threats,” Breaking
Defense, May 19, 2014.
38      Stephen D. Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2004), 53.
39      T.X. Hammes, “Cheap Technology Will Challenge U.S. Tactical Dominance,” Joint Forces
Quarterly 81 (2nd Quarter 2016): 76–85.
40      Kenneth Katzman, Israel: Missile Defense Cooperation with the United States, RS20516 (Washington,
DC: CRS, 2000).
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escalating costs led to the program’s cancelation.41 By 2007, the Defense
Science Board pointed to “lack of progress” and a “marked decline in
interest on the part of operational customers, force providers, and industry,” indicating pessimism about the near-term viability of tactical
HELs had returned.42 Consequently, the United States curtailed much
of its spending on HELs.43
Some efforts to develop tactical lasers within the 10 to 100 kW
range did continue, focusing on resolving size, weight, and power
incompatibilities with operational platforms. The Army’s 10-kW highenergy laser mobile demonstrator and the Navy’s 30-kW laser weapon
system provide notable examples of systems on platforms.44 To enhance
operational viability during the last decade, researchers developed fiber
lasers to be compact and below the high-energy power threshold. The
ability to combine their beams coherently allows the total output power
to be increased while maintaining good beam quality.45 Driven by greater
commercial interest, the parallel development of fiber lasers as well as
image-recognition and targeting systems increase beam accuracy, range,
and quality while reducing the size and the weight of the weapon systems
relative to their power output.46 This new innovation infrastructure has
closed the gap between the promise and technological readiness of
tactical laser weapon systems.
More states are now developing such systems. Britain, for example,
plans to test its combined fiber laser weapon, dubbed the Dragonfire,
against land and sea targets by 2019.47 Similar projects are underway in
many other technologically advanced nations, especially China.48 Thus,
tactical lasers have likely reached a point of maturity whereby they will
soon be fielded in a greater number of real operational settings.49
41      Sharon Weinberger, “Laser Weapons Better Against Rockets?,” Wired, February 25, 2008;
Michael R. Dahlberg and Michael E. Cochrane, “Tactical High-Energy Laser (THEL) as a Weapon
System in Future Theater Air and Missile Defense (TAMD),” ed. Ernest A. Dorko, Proceedings of
the Society of Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engineers (SPIE) 3612 (June 1999): 111–16.
42      AT&L, Defense Science Board Task Force on Directed Energy Weapons (Washington, DC: DoD,
2007), ix.
43      Mark Gunzinger and Chris Dougherty, Changing the Game: The Promise of Directed-Energy
Weapons (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2012), 56.
44      Joseph Trevithick, “The US Army’s Laser-Armed Stryker Has Blasted Dozens of Drones,”
The Drive, April 17, 2017; “HEL MD Destroys Mortars Midflight,” Boeing, accessed April 15, 2019;
and Kashmira Gander and Rob Williams, “Laser Gun: US Navy Unveils New Weapon with Video
Showing Speedboat Explosion,” Independent, December 10, 2014.
45      Zejin Liu et al., “High-Power Coherent Beam Polarization Combination of Fiber Lasers:
Progress and Prospect [Invited],” Journal of the Optical Society of America B 34, no. 3 (2017): A7–
A14; and Zejin Liu et al., “Coherent Beam Combining of High Power Fiber Lasers: Progress and
Prospect,” Science China Technological Sciences 56, no. 7 (July 2013): 1597–1606.
46      “Fiber Laser Applications,” SPI Lasers, accessed April 15, 2019; and Extance, “Laser
Weapons,” 410.
47      “Case Study: UK Dragonfire—Transforming Future Weapons Technology,” QinetiQ blog,
November 23, 2017.
48      Liu Zhen, “How China’s Military Has Zeroed In on Laser Technology,” South China Morning
Post, May 4, 2018; David Szondy, “Rheinmetall’s 50kW High-Energy Laser Weapon Successfully
Passes Tests,” News Atlas, December 20, 2012; and Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkish Indigenous Laser
Weapon Advances,” Defense News, February 14, 2015.
49      Ellis, Directed-Energy Weapons, 4.
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Despite these advances, tactical HEL weapon systems remain bulky,
costly, and sensitive to vibration—features warfighters do not find
appealing. Furthermore, the systems require highly skilled operators
and maintenance crews to keep them functioning. Yet the smaller and
more efficient laser systems become, the more likely it is that militaries
will look to use them for point defense or for protecting expeditionary
ground, naval, and air assets.50

Great-Power Rivalry

Against the backdrop of today’s great-power rivalry, some types
of sophisticated HEL systems are viewed as potential solutions to key
problems in power projection (in the case of the United States) or as a
means of exploiting a critical vulnerability of an adversary (in the case
of China and Russia). Aside from ballistic missile defense, America’s
most ambitious efforts enhance the survivability of air, and potentially
maritime, platforms in an anti-access/area denial environment. This
capability is especially relevant in the western Pacific, where China
has fielded a series of interrelated missile, sensor, guidance, and other
technologies to restrict regional access, threatening core international
security interests.51
The success or failure of the US response to this challenge is highly
contingent on the ability to penetrate heavily defended airspace.52 In
this context, the possibility of plane-mounted lasers for air platform
survival generates considerable hype in the United States. Size, weight,
and power issues as well as targeting considerations—not least, keeping
a beam focused on the vulnerable spot of a target for a minimum dwell
time to achieve a “kill”—make fitting laser systems onto fast-moving
air platforms tremendously more challenging than mounting a device
on a ship or vehicle.
Nonetheless, by 2021, the Air Force hopes to demonstrate a 50-kW
airborne laser can feasibly acquire, track, aim, and fire a beam at a
dynamic target, such as an incoming missile, from a fighter jet traveling
at transonic and supersonic speeds.53 By 2030, the United States
expects to arm an aircraft with high-energy lasers capable of defending
itself against integrated air defenses.54 Clearly, the allure of lasers as a
revolutionary technology has returned, and not just in America.
Russia and China consider lasers a means of obviating key US
advantages in space such as satellite-based military reconnaissance and
50      Ellis, Directed-Energy Weapons, 38.
51      Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/
Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia,” International Security
41, no. 1 (Summer 2016): 7. See also, Evan Braden Montgomery, “Contested Primacy in the Western
Pacific: China’s Rise and the Future of U.S. Power Projection,” International Security 38, no. 4 (Spring
2014): 115–49.
52      Air-Sea Battle Office, Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial
Challenges (Washington, DC: Air-Sea Battle Office, 2013), 3.
53      GEN James “Mike” Holmes, “Directed Energy Summit” (speech, Directed Energy Summit,
Washington, DC, March 29, 2017).
54      Holmes, “Directed Energy Summit.”
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surveillance as well as satellite-based communications that can affect
economic transactions. Thus, fielding anti-satellite systems makes sense
to America’s adversaries. As Daniel R. Coats, the director of the Office
of National Intelligence, told lawmakers, “Russia and China perceive a
need to offset any US military advantage derived from military, civil,
or commercial space systems and are increasingly considering attacks
against satellite systems as part of their future warfare doctrine.” 55
Given the sensitivities surrounding Russian defense projects, it is
difficult to gauge progress accurately, however, some evidence suggests
Russia has revived its original airborne laser weapon project for antisatellite capabilities.56 Consistent with Moscow’s record of exaggeration,
Russian defense officials have also recently boasted of an impending
breakthrough in laser weapons.57 In contrast, Beijing’s efforts to develop
laser weapons to counter space advantages became apparent during the
late 1990s only when reports on “Chinese efforts to purchase or develop
low- and high-powered laser technology, [radio frequency] jammers, and
other capabilities that could be used against satellites” surfaced.58 A more
recent report confirmed China’s 2005 success “of a ground-based laser
weapon that was used to ‘blind’ an orbiting satellite.” 59 More recently,
the Chinese government allowed scientists to speculate the country
could develop a space-based laser weapon to target satellites.
Therefore, a major breakthrough in HEL weapons, especially in a
period of rising tensions, could be highly destabilizing. China would
view an increased US ability to penetrate its anti-access/area denial
environment with alarm. Likewise, the United States would consider
the development of more advanced anti-satellite laser weapon systems
provocative. But given the long lead times involved in maturing and
testing HEL weapon systems, surprises are unlikely. Furthermore, there
are other ways to destroy or disrupt satellites.60
To be sure, guard must be kept against being surprised by leapahead technologies. But as current confrontations attest, states are
just as likely to be surprised, and perhaps outmaneuvered, by enemies
creatively employing simple and established technologies. Moreover,
the biggest threats to American satellites are perhaps nonkinetic, such
as the jamming of satellite-based positioning and communications

55      Hearing on Worldwide Threats Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 115th Cong. (2017)
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capabilities.61 But anti-satellite laser weapons hold a unique niche in
conducting difficult-to-attribute attacks due to the difficulty of proving
if a satellite failure was caused by a technical issue or an attack.62
Global power distribution differs much from the Cold War when
the United States lacked a technological peer. China is already fielding
comparable, if not superior, weapon systems and investing in such military innovations as robotics, artificial intelligence, and autonomous
vehicles. In all these cases, commercialization feeds technology development and eases acquisition costs.
Conversely, powerful HELs have a small, albeit growing, commercial
footprint that results in the majority of R&D funding coming from
defense sources. Moreover, the United States placed severe export
restrictions on end-state and component technologies. As a consequence,
China and Russia will likely find it more difficult to keep pace with
developments in advanced HEL systems, especially those designed for
air, maritime, and ballistic missile defense. These lasers could remain
an area of technological competition in which America can potentially
maintain significant long-term advantages.

Conclusion

Despite the hype and the disappointment associated with emerging
technologies and the reality that research funding evaporates in the
absence of immediate success, high-energy lasers are an anomaly.63 At their
inception, lasers were not a solution-orientated defense technology. Over
time, however, the potential for one laser that can perform a variety of
weaponized tasks contributed to the technology’s enduring attractiveness
to the defense industry. Large defense contractors, incentivized by the
prospect of securing government funding for conducting high-risk
R&D, have likely encouraged additional hype about the possibilities
of developing and fielding ambitious laser weapon systems. Defeating
ballistic missiles has been the primary rationale for their development,
but enthusiasm for the potential of lasers in an air platform defense role
within an anti-access/area denial environment exists.
Unlike the hypothetical megawatt weapons or the highly
sophisticated systems being developed for air platform survival, groundbased and ship- and vehicle-mounted tactical lasers have established an
operational viability. This role is especially useful for countering rockets,
artillery, and mortars as well as defeating cheap, plentiful drones and
small, unmanned, boats. At a time of downward pressure on Western
61      Lin Jinshun et al., “Countermeasure Technology for MMW Satellite Links,” Aerospace
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Accounting Information Systems 9, no. 4 (2008): 240–52.
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defense budgets, the full integration of high-energy lasers into future
warfighting concepts will depend on overcoming the reputation of
exaggerated expectations and poor technical outcomes, such as the
degradation of laser propagation through the atmosphere.
Calculating precisely the part hype has played in the technological
maturation of HELs and their ostensible readiness in a tactical role today
is hard. Because hype helps to channel resources at critical junctures in the
innovation life cycle, it may prove a significant factor in the emergence of
some long-fuse technologies.64 Enthusiasm for a particular technology
may not be ill-placed. An unrealistic appreciation of the timeframe for
its readiness, however, is often the problem: “We invariably overestimate
the short-term impact of a truly transformational discovery, while
underestimating its longer-term effects.” 65 As America’s military seeks
to retain its edge, the experience for developing laser weapons should
serve as a warning about being drawn in by a technology’s promise to
deliver rapid advantages.
With little commercial interest in powerful HELs until recently, the
industry has relied on enduring military interest and the corresponding
allocation of R&D defense dollars to fund crucial advances in the
technology. In contrast, much of the technology identified in the Third
Offset Strategy is being developed in the commercial sector for civilian
uses. The United States is attempting to leverage its technological
superiority beyond commercial, off-the-shelf technologies that are
also available to its adversaries. Unique advantages can only be derived
from greater symbiosis between military and commercial innovation.66
America would therefore do well to invest its defense R&D funds in an
array of emerging technologies and across the full industry ecosystem,
including nondefense commercial firms, to see what grows over time.
The Department of Defense should follow this approach to maintain
technological military superiority rather than allowing money to
follow hype.
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